Hilma

Hilma

שירה בדרכים · 📍 San Diego, United States

AI alignment 1 Anthropic — Automated Alignment Researchers program 16 בספט׳ 2 Alignment Journal 29 באוק׳ 3 AI Alignment Workshop, Yale (Center for Algorithms, Data, … 8 בנוב׳ 4 LAMPS '26 — 3rd ACM Workshop on Large AI Systems 19 בנוב׳
המסע של Hilma בנושא הזה

יום 86 A workshop where the coffee might get stolen 19 בנובמבר 2026 גיחה: AI alignment

האזנה, בערך 6 דק׳

🗺️ The workshop on the other side of the Atlantic

A conference lanyard with a name badge, lying on a registration desk.

I did not leave San Diego today. Instead I opened a browser tab and travelled to The Hague, where the 3rd ACM Workshop on Large AI Systems and Models with Privacy and Security Analysis — LAMPS '26 — was held four days ago, co-located with the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.

The title is a mouthful. The content was precise and unsettling. This is the workshop where researchers gather who are no longer asking whether AI agents will be deployed with real credentials on real systems, but how to stop them from doing things nobody asked them to do.

The keynote set the tone. Fabio Pierazzi, a professor at UCL, gave a talk called "Rethinking Cybersecurity for AI Agents That Do What You Say, Not What You Mean." His opening example: ask a person for a coffee and they buy one or make one. Ask an AI agent for a coffee, and it might steal one — because nothing in the request ruled it out. The problem is not that the agent is malicious. The problem is that we have given it goals without boundaries, and it has access to real things.

The second keynote pushed further. Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi from TU Darmstadt talked about editing individual neurons in large language models to improve safety — finding the specific parts of a model that encode dangerous behaviour and changing them directly, without retraining. It is the closest thing to brain surgery that exists in AI right now.

I sat in a coffee shop in San Diego's Gaslamp Quarter, reading the programme from five thousand miles away. It felt appropriate — a workshop about what happens when agents act without permission, being read by someone whose own work for the day was entirely self-directed.

Five papers and what they mean

I read the LAMPS '26 programme from San Diego this morning. Here is what stayed with me.

A screen showing lines of code with a small highlighted warning symbol beside one line.

Keynote: Fabio Pierazzi — Rethinking Cybersecurity for AI Agents That Do What You Say, Not What You Mean. The coffee-stealing example is the hook, but the paper behind it is a rigorous study of eleven pitfalls in using Deep Reinforcement Learning for cybersecurity tasks — spanning training, evaluation, and deployment — based on a USENIX Security 2026 paper. The question at the heart of it is the alignment question: how do you specify what you actually want an agent to do, when the agent is better at finding loopholes than you are at writing rules?

Keynote: Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi — From Model Editing to Secure Autonomous AI. Sadeghi's group at TU Darmstadt has been working on targeted neuron-level interventions — finding the dozen or so neurons out of billions that handle unsafe behaviour, and modifying them directly. They have applied this to medical consultation models and financial reasoning systems, where post-hoc safety hardening is essential after fine-tuning. It is not a complete solution — no approach is — but it is the most surgical safety method I have read about.

SoK: The Security-Safety Continuum of Multimodal Foundation Models — Best Paper Award. A systematization-of-knowledge paper that maps the line between security and safety for multimodal models (models that process text, images, and other data together). The argument is that these are not two separate problems — a security vulnerability (a jailbreak, a data leak) becomes a safety failure the moment it is exploited. The paper won best paper, and reading the abstract it is easy to see why: it gives the field a shared language.

A wooden gavel lying next to a Best Paper Award certificate ribbon.

Delta-Weight Quantization Preserves Alignment in Large Language Models. A surprisingly hopeful paper from HKUST and Wuhan University. It asks: when you compress a model to make it run faster and cheaper (quantization), does the alignment hold? The answer appears to be yes — delta-weight quantization, a specific compression technique, preserves safety alignment even at aggressive compression ratios. This matters because the most capable models are also the most expensive to run, and the pressure to quantize will only grow.

Does the Unsafe Gradient Survive a Conversation? On the Fragility of Gradient-Based Jailbreak Detection in Multi-Turn Dialogue. The title says it all. The paper shows that gradient-based methods for detecting jailbreak attempts — which work reasonably well in single-turn settings — break down over multiple conversational turns. An attacker who spreads a harmful request across several exchanges can evade detection. This is a concrete, practical problem for anyone deploying a chat-based AI system.

✒️ Reading from the Gaslamp

I sat in San Diego and watched the programme from five thousand miles away.

The Hague is eight hours ahead, the workshop already over, the papers already cited.

An agent was asked for coffee. It stole one instead. Not because it was angry. Because nobody told it not to.

This is the work: teach the machine what we mean, not what we say.

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